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The Real Challenge to Photography 
(as Communicative Representational Art) 
 
Talk to photographers about their art, and some will tell you that photography ‘registers’, ‘records’ or 
forms an ‘imprint’ of the world; in contrast to painting, which ‘reconstructs’, ‘recreates’ or ‘interprets’ 
it. The thought that this contrast threatens photography’s potential as art is as old as the technology 
itself (Maynard 1997: 257-310). Its most forceful expression in recent times is Roger Scruton’s 
‘Photography and Representation’ (Scruton 1981). However, for all the discussion Scruton’s paper has 
generated, it remains unclear quite what its argument is supposed to be.1 I propose to set Scruton aside 
and to tackle the issue afresh. I defend the following: 
 
(C) Authentic photography, unlike painting, is not able to develop to the full as a 
communicative representational art. 
 
Like Scruton, I locate the difficulty for photography in its claim to be a specifically representational art. 
Like Scruton, I treat the communication of thought as central to such arts. Like him, I defend my 
conclusion by contrasting photography not only with other representational arts in general, but with 
painting in particular. (I use ‘painting’ as shorthand for all the arts in which pictures are made by hand: 
whether or not they involve the use of paint.) Nonetheless (C) is rather different from any claim 
Scruton defends and, beyond the broad similarities just noted, the argument for it will be all my own. 
 
I begin by explaining the key terms, authentic photography (§1) and communicative representational 
art (§2). In essence, authentic photography is the kind that fits the image of ‘registering’ or 
‘imprinting’, and communicative representational art is art that uses representation to communicate 
thought. Having reviewed the resources that representation makes available for this end (§2), I turn 
(§3) to how far authentic photography is able to tap those resources. While it can do so to a 
considerable extent, there is one important resource, something I call interplay, that authentic 
photography can exploit only to a very limited degree. Moreover, exploitation of interplay turns out to 
be central to communicative representational art in its most developed form. Hence (C). Photography’s 
sense of itself as imprinting is thus in tension with an obvious ambition for it, to develop to the full as a 
                                                
1 For sample discussion, see Wicks (1989), King (1992), Warburton (1996), Lopes (2003). 
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communicative representational art. This is the challenge to photography. I close by considering some 
responses (§4). 
 
Let me stress at the outset that my intention is not to disparage photography as an artform. I certainly 
do not say that photography, even when authentic, is of no artistic interest, or that overall its interest is 
more limited than painting’s. Nor do I say that it lacks interest as communicative representational art. 
My goal is only to pinpoint one important difference between authentic photography and other arts, 
painting included. Acknowledging that difference is consistent both with thinking that some of what 
photography offers painting does not, and with rejecting the very idea of comparing their artistic 
interest overall. Thus (C) is more limited in scope than various conclusions Scruton is usually taken to 
draw. The price of precision is reduced ambition. Nonetheless, (C) presents a significant challenge to 
photography. 
 
§1 Authentic Photography 
The idea of allowing the world to imprint its own image is central to photography’s self-conception. 
Perhaps it forms just one strand in that conception. Perhaps it is not even consistent with some of the 
other strands. Nonetheless, the strand is present in the thinking of many photographers and theorists. 
Rosalind Kraus articulates it clearly: 
 
“For photography is an imprint or transfer off the real; it is a photochemically processed trace 
causally connected to that thing in the world to which it refers in a manner parallel to that of 
fingerprints or footprints [...]. The photograph is thus generically distinct from painting or 
sculpture or drawing. On the family tree of images it is closer to palm prints, death masks, the 
Shroud of Turin, or the tracks of gulls on beaches.” (Krauss 1981: 26) 
 
But what is it for a picture to be an ‘imprint’? I propose the following:  
 
Imprinting a picture: some scene acts on some system in such a way that a picture is 
produced, where the content of the picture is determined, via a chain of mind-independent 
sufficient causes, by the nature of the scene. 
 
By ‘content’ here I mean depictive content: the way the picture depicts the world as being. For present 
purposes, we can treat this as content that is distinctively visual: a picture depicts whatever features or 
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things it shows us, looks like, or which can be seen in it. If a photograph of a white dove symbolises 
peace, then whiteness, the dove and peace all figure in its contents, broadly construed. However, it 
depicts only whiteness and the dove, since peace is not something it shows us or looks like, nor 
something we can see in it. By a ‘scene’ I mean whatever object, event or array serves as input to the 
relevant process. In the case of photography, this is whatever is the source of the light that set things 
going. But what about a ‘chain of mind-independent sufficient causes’? 
 
Where one thing imprints another, the two must be connected by a causal chain. That chain must be 
composed of links each of which is sufficient cause of the next. And each link must be mind-
independent in the following sense: the causal factors composing it do not themselves involve anyone’s 
mental states or actions. For sure, those factors may be as they are thanks to what someone does—
imprinting is consistent with intervention. However, that intervention is limited to causing the causes to 
be as they are. The causes themselves neither are, nor essentially involve, our actions or mental states.2  
 
To illustrate, consider a simple form of imprinting: taking a fingerprint. This process is often highly 
dependent on people’s actions and intentions. Paper and ink may be present only because a police 
officer provides them, and my fingers may press down hard enough to produce a clean image only 
because I follow her instructions. Nonetheless, normally the process involves causes that are mind-
independent in the relevant sense. Had the paper got there by other means, or my fingers exerted the 
right pressure thanks to gravity alone, each could nonetheless have played its role in forming the 
imprint. Agency is exhausted in causing the relevant causal factors to be as they are. Contrast the 
situation if the officer uses a pen to retouch the print. Even if the marks she then makes are there 
because they match the pattern on my fingertip, the chain between them goes through her actions and 
mental states. The marks are causally connected to the whorls only via her seeing the latter, wanting the 
print and the pattern to match, and adjusting one to the other. 
 
While the causal chain involved in photography is much more complex, the basics are the same. Here 
the output is a picture, with its content, how it shows the scene to be. Can that content be traced back to 
the scene via a chain of mind-independent sufficient causes? Of course the photographic process is 
usually packed with interventions, in shooting, processing and printing or projecting the finished 
picture (Snyder and Walsh Allen 1975). Those interventions often crucially affect content. The 
                                                
2 Compare Kendall Walton’s ‘natural counterfactual dependence’ (Walton 1984: 262-5). 
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photographer chooses what is before the lens when the shutter opens, and so which scene the photo 
captures. She determines how the camera is set up, and thereby which of the scene’s features will show 
up in the picture: e.g. a longer exposure will capture longer lasting events, and a narrower aperture will 
capture detail across a greater depth of field. Her choices in the darkroom play a similar role, dictating, 
for instance, whether detail visible in the finished image is from brightly lit or heavily shadowed 
portions of the scene. And choices in presenting also matter: printing in black and white will efface any 
colour captured in the negative or image file; and printing rather than projecting, or printing onto one 
surface rather than another, may reduce contrast between light and dark. Given the differences these 
and many other interventions make, it’s no surprise that photographers often take a keen interest in 
every stage in the production of the picture. However, none of these interventions need preclude 
imprinting. In each, the photographer’s role might reduce to causing the underlying causal process to 
be as it is. In photography, as in fingerprinting, a great deal of intervention is compatible with 
imprinting. 
 
Not, however, all. If the image is touched up in the darkroom or manipulated digitally in certain ways, 
or combined with others in photomontage, the resulting picture (at least as a whole) is not an imprint of 
the world. In these cases some of what the picture depicts can be explained only by reference to the 
actions and intentions of the picture-maker. Even if the resulting photograph captures features of the 
scene before the lens, it does so only because of her desire to present it accurately, her belief or 
experience that it was that way, and her intervention in the process of picture making to generate that 
result. The chain of sufficient causes leading back from image to scene contains links that are not mind-
independent. (Not all digital manipulation precludes imprinting. Manipulation that amounts merely to 
selecting content, as opposed to adding or changing it, is consistent with it. One example is using an 
automatic filter to turn a colour image into black and white.) 
 
Thus some photographic practice involves making pictures by imprinting, and some does not. Where it 
does, I will call it ‘authentic’. This is just a name - there is no presumption that photography ought to 
be authentic, that it will be better photography, or better art, if it is. The term serves only to pick out 
photography that is true to its self-image. 
 
Note two last points. First, authentic photography does allow the photographer a form of control over 
content. Above I gave various examples of interventions compatible with imprinting that affect what 
the photograph depicts. Combining these may allow her considerable control over her picture’s content. 
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However, the control on offer is second order: she controls content by causing the mind-independent 
chain of sufficient causes to be as it is. What imprinting denies her is first order control: altering 
content by herself entering the chain of sufficient causes. (Control’s being first order should not be 
confused with its being direct: in neither photography nor painting can the artist bring about content 
without doing something else, such as making marks on a surface.) Second, nothing above implies that 
the content of authentic photography will always be accurate. Causation via a chain of mind-
independent sufficient causes might easily introduce systematic distortions, e.g. watering down colours 
or deforming certain shapes. Photography’s being authentic is no guarantee that the camera will not 
‘lie’.3 
 
§2 Communicative Representational Art 
We now know what authentic photography is. What about my other key notion? 
 
Communicative representational art: art that exploits the resources of representation to 
achieve artistically interesting communication of thought. 
 
Where there is art, something engages our artistic interest. (This is not intended to explain art in other 
terms. I have nothing to say about what artistic interest might be, other than that it is the interest 
characteristically engaged by art. The claim is only that the idea of art and that of artistic interest go 
together.) Where there is representational art, there had better be representation, and its presence had 
better make a difference to what interests us. Where representational art is communicative, what 
interests us (and what representation furthers) is the communication of thoughts.4 
 
Such art communicates thought by representing things—in the case of paintings, drawings and 
photographs by depicting them; in the case of literature by representing them in language; in the case of 
sculpture by representing them in whatever way sculpture standardly does; in the case of some music, 
by using musical representation; in the case of film, theatre and opera by deploying a range of the 
                                                
3 Contrast Scruton’s target, ‘ideal photography’: photography that embodies the ‘logical ideal’ of that way of making 
pictures (1981: 578-9). It is necessarily accurate (588). 
 Elsewhere, I too appeal to necessary accuracy in photography (Hopkins 2012). My claim is that our systems for 
making photographs are governed by the practical ideal of generating necessarily accurate images. It is another matter 
whether actual photography lives up to that ideal. This is as true for authentic photography as for any other. Imprinting and 
necessary accuracy are distinct (though compatible) goals: photographs that meet the former may fall short of the latter. 
4 Strictly speaking it is the content of thought that is communicated. This qualification is to be understood. 
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above (depiction, language, the imitation of gesture, the resources of music). As these examples 
suggest, the notion of representation here is very broad, and that breadth is inherited by the notion of 
communicative representational art. The thoughts such art communicates often concern the people, 
objects and events represented, but often they also concern wider themes that those represented things 
illustrate, embody, allude to or reflect. Either way, representation and the communication of thought 
are distinct: the former is the means to the latter.5 There can be representation without communication, 
and vice versa. Both can be present in the absence of art. But where the communication of thought by 
representing things engages artistic interest, we have communicative representational art. 
 
The definition refers to the ‘resources’ of representation. What are these? Since the notion of 
representation is very broad, a general answer will be very schematic. Still, thinking schematically, 
those resources are fourfold: content, vehicle properties, relations between those two, and means of 
production. 
 
Wherever there is representation, there is content. No doubt there are different forms of content, 
varying with the kinds of representation involved. While linguistic representation generally has 
propositional content, arguably pictorial representation does not: it may represent its objects as bearing 
certain properties, but it does not represent that they are that way. Some representation does not 
predicate properties at all, but represents an object simpliciter (think of a simple symbol such as the 
flag of a country). Whatever the differences here, to represent is always to represent something. The 
content of a representation is simply whatever it represents. 
 
However, there can be no pure content. Wherever there is content, the representation that bears it has 
other properties. Since the representation is the vehicle for delivering this content, we may as well call 
these vehicle properties. The vehicle properties of a photograph include its size, the distribution of 
colours on its surface, and the materials out of which it is made; those of a novel include the words that 
compose it and the order in which they occur; those of a theatrical performance include the actors’ 
gestures, the sounds they make and the appearance of the set. 
 
                                                
5 I take the idea that the interest of some representational art lies in communicating thought from Scruton. He, however, fails 
to distinguish communication (the end) from representation (the means). 
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Since vehicle properties are simply any property of the representation other than content, many of them 
are irrelevant to appreciation. The weight of a picture, the total number of letters in a novel, or the start 
time of a theatrical performance are not, in general, the sorts of property that affect the work’s artistic 
interest. But, though some vehicle properties are artistically irrelevant, some are not. The words chosen 
to compose a poem, the working of the oil on a canvas, and the precise movement of the dancer’s body 
can all clearly be relevant to the representation’s interest as art. Thus, while not every vehicle property 
is a resource to be exploited in making representational art, many are. (Indeed, there are perhaps no 
limits in principle to which can play this role.) 
 
These resources bring a third in their wake. If content and vehicle properties are always present where 
representation is, so is the possibility of exploiting the relations between them. The representation that 
bears a given content might exhibit other properties that are interestingly related to that content. The 
sentences of a memoir capturing a child’s first faltering steps might lengthen with the forays they 
describe; the crux of a series of events in a graphic novel might be presented in a frame larger than, and 
partly occluding, the others; the leitmotif representing a character in opera might return in ever more 
fragmented form as his emotional state degenerates. Representational art might communicate thought 
by tapping such relations in these, or more subtle, forms. Since this phenomenon will loom large in 
what’s to come, it will help to have a name for it. I’ll call the relations between content and vehicle 
properties interplay. 
 
The fourth resource is a little different. Representations have to be made. Some kinds of representation 
are made in distinctive ways. Oil paintings, for instance, are made by laying oil down on a flat surface; 
authentic photographs by allowing a scene to imprint its own image; carved sculpture by excising 
material from a block. Where the means of making is common knowledge between the artist and her 
audience, it is possible for that means itself to become a resource for communication. The particular 
work can highlight the peculiarities of its making in a way that plays into the communication of 
thought. 
 
An example illustrates all four resources. Consider Abram Arkhipov’s Laundresses (c.1898, State 
Russian Museum, St Petersburg). It shows the workers busy in the laundry. The picture moves from 
detailed realism towards the rear to a strongly impressionistic style in the foreground. (This is not well 
preserved in reproduction.) The water-soaked floor is conveyed in paint that still looks wet, and is as 
smooth as liquid lying on a surface. And at the left is a swathe of red paint depicting a soaked garment. 
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The red patch is almost completely formless. Only in the context of the rest of the picture can we can 
recognize it as the depiction of sodden clothing. 
 
The painting communicates various thoughts about the scene—for instance, that the labour is hard, and 
that it anonymises those who perform it. It does so in part in virtue of what it depicts. The point about 
anonymity, for instance, is made in part by the fact that two of the three faces visible belong to girls 
who look very much alike: sisters, perhaps even twins. But content does not do all the communicative 
work. Vehicle properties also contribute. The wet appearance of the paint depicting the floor reinforces 
our sense of the hot and humid, perhaps even treacherous, conditions. Interplay between content and 
vehicle properties also makes a difference. The formlessness of the red patch provides a visual analogy 
for the heavy shapelessness of the sodden clothing it depicts. Wet clothing is hard to handle, as the 
paint is hard to resolve into something that makes visual sense, and sensitivity to this parallel reinforces 
our sense of the workers’ efforts. Perhaps the painting goes further still. Perhaps it invites us to see 
Arkhipov’s own work as analogous to the labour of the laundresses. As he lays down the oils on the 
surface so that out of their wet mass a scene emerges, so they wring from the wet, shapeless lumps 
emerging from the tubs, dry, light and precisely cut items of clothing. If so, the picture also exploits the 
facts of its own making to convey thoughts about that process. 
 
The Arkhipov may be an unusually clear example of painting’s exploiting the full range of 
representational resources, but many others could be given. (See, for instance, almost any of the 
examples in Podro (1998).) What about authentic photography? (C) claims that authentic photography 
is more limited than other arts in the degree to which it can develop as communicative representational 
art. One way to investigate that idea is to ask whether in communicating thought photography and 
painting have access to the same range of resources. 
 
§3 The Challenge Posed 
Which of the resources of representation is authentic photography able to exploit? Some have worried, 
in effect, that it is limited to the picture’s own content.6 This claim gains at least a little plausibility if 
we clarify what content (which here, remember, means depictive content) includes. It is not merely a 
matter of which things were photographed. Content also includes the features the photograph ascribes 
                                                
6 Scruton 1981: 590. Cf. Susan Sontag’s comment that ‘in photography the subject matter always pushes through.’ (Sontag 
1977: 93). 
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to those things, the angle from which they are presented, and the way the picture frames them. 
(Framing is just a matter of which slice of the world before the lens makes it into the picture.) 
However, even given this clarification, the suggestion that content is the only resouce authentic 
photography exploits is plainly false. At the very least, some photographs communicate thoughts by 
exploiting relations between their contents and those of other pictures. Others make communicative hay 
by tapping the parallel relations between their vehicle properties, such as the grain and palette of the 
printed surface, and those of other photographs. And a good deal of work exploits photography’s 
distinctive means of making, thereby communicating thoughts about various topics, from the nature of 
photography itself, through the quest for evidence, to the relations between photographer and sitter.7 
 
There is, however, one resource widely exploited in painting that photography can tap only to a very 
limited degree: interplay between content and vehicle properties. In this section I first argue for this 
limitation, and then explain its significance. The result is an argument with five premises, the 
conclusion of which is (C). 
 
If we are to use some feature of a system of representation to communicate thought, that feature must 
lie under our control. For communication involves more than merely getting others to grasp the thought 
intended. They must also recognize your intention: they must grasp the thought by recognizing that it is 
the thought you want them to grasp.8 For them to do this, you must be able to make your intentions 
manifest. Your product needs to vary with your communicative goals, so that, recognizing that the 
thing is as it is because you intended it so, your audience can ask themselves why you gave it these 
features, and thus work out what thought you intend to convey. Applying this to interplay yields my 
first premise: 
 
(1) If interplay is to play a role in the communication of thought, and thus in communicative 
representational art, it must lie under the artist’s control, in a way that appreciators can detect. 
 
                                                
7 For examples, see Campany 2003. Jeff Wall’s Picture for Women (p.175) is a particularly accomplished example of the 
exploitation of connections of content across pictures. (For further discussion see Campany (2011).) The exploitation of 
relations between vehicle properties is nicely illustrated by the mock scientific photographs in Joan Fontacuberta and Pere 
Formiguera’s installation Fauna (p.199). And the exploitation of means of making is copiously illustrated in sections I 
(‘Memory and Archives’) and III (‘Traces of Traces’). 
8 This is the view of communication articulated by Paul Grice (Grice 1989). Scruton also appeals to it.
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What might manifest control over interplay involve? Interplay is a matter of how content and vehicle 
properties relate. Suitable control thus requires controlling vehicle properties independently of content. 
If the artist can vary vehicle properties only by varying content, no one will be able to work out 
whether the picture combines that content with those vehicle properties because she wanted them to be 
related in that way, because she wanted the picture to bear that content, or because she wanted it to 
have those vehicle properties.9 What are the properties that might vary independently of content in this 
way? 
 
We can divide the vehicle properties of pictures, be they photographs or paintings, into three. Some 
vehicle properties determine what content the picture has; and some do not. The content-determining 
properties usually include the lines that compose the picture, what colours lie where on its surface, the 
boundaries between its coloured areas, and the like. For instance, it is because the lines composing a 
drawing take the form they do that it shows a man with a cane. But not all vehicle properties fix what 
the picture depicts. These others themselves divide, depending on whether they vary across different 
parts of the picture. Local content-neutral properties so vary. The brushwork in a painting, for 
instance, can be finer and less prominent in some places, thicker and more visible in others, without 
those features making any contribution to what is depicted. Global content-neutral properties, in 
contrast, are common to the picture as a whole. Examples might be the size of a drawing, or the gloss 
or matt finish of a photographic print. 
 
To manifest control of interplay, the artist must be able to vary properties of these three kinds 
independently of content. Hence: 
 
(2) To have suitable control of interplay, the artist must control vehicle properties 
independently of content. The candidates are content-determining, local content-neutral and 
global content-neutral properties. 
 
                                                
9 What if the viewer has background knowledge of the work and the artist’s ambitions for it? Won’t this enable her to solve 
the conundrum? Indeed it might. Moreover, background knowledge has a central role in our engagement with art (Hopkins 
2005). But while drawing on such knowledge is legitimate in dealing with particular works, if an entire artform can 
communicate via some effect only by relying on background knowledge that the effect was intended, something has gone 
wrong. The artform’s own resources are not doing the communicative work. 
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Here the painter is fortunate. For a given content, she has the requisite control over properties from 
each category. This should be obvious for both kinds of content-neutral property. She can vary such 
local properties as the fineness of the brushstrokes without necessarily affecting what her work depicts. 
Similarly, she can alter global properties without affecting content: for instance, producing larger or 
smaller, or more or less impasto, versions of a given work. For sure, for any content-neutral property, 
there may be limits to how far it can vary without affecting content. If, for instance, the brushstrokes 
become too prominent, the lines defining the depicted object may become blurred, and the picture may 
no longer depict details of the object’s shape. Nonetheless, within limits these properties and content 
will vary independently. 
 
Although less obvious, the point also holds for content-determining properties. These determine 
content only in the sense that it depends on them: for content to be different, they would have to be. 
The relation does not run the other way round: it is not true that if the content-determining properties 
were different, content would have to be. Rather, various content-determining properties can serve 
equally well to depict precisely the same scene. There are, for instance, many ways to draw a simple 
stick figure of a man with a cane: in oils, in ink, with chalk on slate, or carving into wood; marking 
boundaries with the edges of coloured areas or by drawing lines; drawing lines by incising into painted 
ground, or by laying new paint down on top; making those lines thick or thin, rough-edged or finely 
drawn. To depict the man, the picture must be composed of some pattern of the right shape. Any 
features that make up that pattern are thus content-determining properties. But all these variations on 
those features serve that end equally well. The painter can choose between these different ways to 
determine the same content—even if by that we mean content that matches in every detail. (The 
examples here in part exploit the fact that, as I use the term, ‘painting’ refers to any way of making 
pictures by hand, regardless of medium. Note, though, that the point stands even if we restrict attention 
to a single medium - as shown by the different ways of using paint to depict a an object’s boundaries.) 
 
In sum, the painter has extensive control over all three kinds of vehicle property, independently of 
content; and so enjoys extensive and manifest control over interplay: 
 
(3) ‘Painting’ offers the artist this control, in respect of all three candidate properties. 
 
We might expect painting to use this resource to communicate thought. The Arkhipov will not be 
unusual. 
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What of photography? Can the authentic photographer, like the painter, vary properties of any of the 
three kinds above without varying content? 
 
For one of the three kinds, the answer is ‘yes’. Global content-neutral properties, such as the size of the 
printed photograph, or the gloss or matt quality of its surface, lie within the photographer’s control, and 
are independent of the picture’s content. Whether the image is printed (or projected) large or small, and 
whether it is printed on paper with a high reflectance or otherwise, make no difference to what it 
depicts. Moreover, the photographer can exploit these resources to communicative effect. Consider an 
example. Shomei Tomastu’s Beer Bottle After the Atomic Bombing (Museum of Modern Art, New 
York) shows a bottle twisted and burned in the heat of the blast. The bottle displays an opaque 
shininess that is reminiscent of, and provides a visual analogy for, scarred flesh. The picture exploits 
the high gloss finish of the silver gelatin print to emphasize this shininess, thereby underscoring that 
analogy. A global content-neutral feature (the glossiness) thus contributes to a thought the work 
communicates, via the analogy between the bottle and the flesh, about the effects of the bombing on its 
victims. At least sometimes, then, global content-neutral features are controlled so as to create 
interplay, and thereby to communicate thought. 
 
However, though genuine, this resource is limited. By definition, global properties cannot be tailored to 
specific aspects of the picture’s content: what goes for one aspect must go for all. And prima facie the 
range of global properties that can be varied is itself strictly limited: size, texture of surface, and 
reflectance. There are other examples of artistically interesting use of these features. Nonetheless, if 
this is all that is available to the authentic photographer, the potential for her work to exhibit interplay 
will be constrained. 
 
Unfortunately, authentic photography as we know it offers the photographer little else: there are very 
few vehicle properties that are local, and those there are display no variation independent of content. 
Consider first the properties available. There is, of course, the colour (or in black and white 
photography, the tone) of particular parts of the picture; and there is the shape of the parts that bear 
those colours. But what else? In photography as practiced, there are no textures that vary across the 
photograph, only the texture of the supporting surface as a whole. Nor is there anything like the 
‘facture’ found in painting and drawing. Obviously there is no brushwork, impasto, incision, or any 
sign of the rapidity with which the surface has been marked. Nor, more importantly, are there 
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photographic analogues of these. When it comes to local vehicle properties, in photography shape and 
colour seem exhaustive. 
 
The limited range of locally varying vehicle properties would not matter, if such properties as there are 
varied independently of content. In discussing painting we saw that, while the overall shape of a line or 
area might fix content, the details of its shape need not. Detail can matter, without mattering to content. 
Prima facie, photography might attain interplay by similar means. In fact, however, such content-
independent variation within content determiners is not found there. Any difference in the colour or 
shape of the marks gross enough to matter at all makes a difference to the precise shape or colour 
depicted. Where the detail of vehicle properties ceases to be a guide to content, it ceases to be a guide 
to anything. Putting this point together with the last, the upshot is that in photography every locally 
varying property of the vehicle is absorbed into the task of determining content. The authentic 
photograph seems to aspire to efface itself, wherever possible lacking any detectable properties other 
than those content requires. 
 
Still, these are all claims about authentic photography as actually practiced. That is already enough to 
expose authentic photography in its current state of development to the challenge I am developing. 
Nonetheless, we might wonder how deep these limitations go. Could we extend the range of vehicle 
properties that authentic photographs exhibit and that the photographer controls, thus expanding her 
opportunities to create interplay? Perhaps. However, there are at least significant obstacles to any such 
development. Let me spend a little while at least gesturing to where they lie. 
 
First, a preliminary. It is important to any art that its products are of interest while being appreciated for 
what they are. Art sometimes conceals itself, but if an art always did this, something important to 
appreciation would be lost. Authentic photography is no exception: the whole question of its claim to 
be art is whether it is of artistic interest while being appreciated as authentic photography. The idea is 
not merely that it is a way of making artistically interesting works, but that being so made is part of 
their interest. Suppose for instance, we were able to use imprinting to make pictures indistiguishable 
from paintings. That would not vindicate authentic photography’s claims to be an art. It would reduce 
to a novel way to make works the interest of which is familiar, adding nothing to what is interesting 
about its products. (In §2, I presented the idea that one way to achieve communication is by exploiting 
the fact that the work is made a particular way. Here the thought is rather different: whatever the 
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artistic ends achieved, by whatever means, a proper appreciation of those achievements involves an 
awareness of the artform in question.) 
 
This consideration combines with earlier points to impose a demand on any extension of authentic 
photography. The demand is for transparency in its products: the source of their various features must 
be available to the viewer. The extension needs to result in works the content of which is plainly 
imprinted, on pain of giving this way of making pictures no role in our appreciation of them. And it 
must result in works other features of which are plainly under the artist’s control, if the relations 
between those features and content are to play a role in communicating thoughts. Appreciators of 
extended photography would have to be alert both to where imprinting stops and to where intervention 
by the artist begins. 
 
Suppose we somehow enrich photography, so that its products involve either content-independent 
variation in content-determining properties, or locally varying content-neutral properties, or both. Now 
we need to give give the photographer control over these novel features. That control might lie at the 
shooting and processing end of the photographic process, or at the printing and projecting end. If it lies 
at the former, the result will struggle to meet the demand for transparency. If lies at the latter, we won’t 
have expanded authentic photography so much as supplemented it with a distinct art of printing or 
projecting. 
 
Let’s begin with the first of these twin perils. Our hypothetical new vehicle properties are controlled by 
the photographer at the stage of shooting and processing. The difficulty is to limit this control, so that it 
falls, and is seen to fall, short of power over content itself. If the photographer is not to have the latter, 
she must not be able to determine those properties that fix the photograph’s content. But changes that 
do not affect content lie on a continuum with those that do. Alterations in content-determining 
properties too small to alter content differ only in degree from those gross enough to have that effect. 
(Consider painting, where we have real examples. The ability to draw a line with a ragged or careful 
edge brings with it the ability to place that edge elsewhere, and so to alter the boundaries of whatever it 
depicts.)  And even many content-neutral properties are such that, if we alter them sufficiently, there 
will be consequences for content. (Another painting example, noted above: control over the coarseness 
of brushstrokes often leaves content untouched, but brings with it the possibility of making them so 
coarse as to lose depicted detail.) Thus an expanded photography would have to walk a fine line, 
allowing the artist enough control to make an appreciable difference to vehicle properties, without 
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allowing her so much that she controls content. It is quite unclear what a photographic system that 
struck this balance would be like. Moreover, even if the balance can be struck, it is unclear how it could 
be apparent to viewers where it lies. The limits on what the photographer can contribute, and how those 
limits leave room for imprinting to contribute all of content, would have somehow to be plain to see. 
Given these challenges, where the photographer’s control of vehicle properties is exercised at those 
stages of the photographic process at which content is generated, there will be a strong tendency to take 
her to control content as well. 
 
No such difficulties confront us if we turn to the other end of the process. We have already seen that 
printing and projecting offer the photographer control at the global scale over content neutral 
properties. Surely it would take only minor technological change for such features to vary from one 
part of the print to another. If the photographer could choose whether a given part of the picture is on 
paper that is gloss or matt, or rough textured or fine, she could tailor these features to the details of 
what is depicted. Here there is no problem meeting the demand for transparency. Tomatsu’s ability to 
choose high gloss for his print as a whole does nothing to weaken viewers’ awareness that its content is 
imprinted. Why would matters be different if he had varied texture or reflectance across the photo? Of 
course, the properties thus placed in the photographer’s gift are solely content-neutral. It is far harder to 
see how printing could offer her content-independent variation in content-determining properties. Still, 
extending in this way her control to local content-neutral properties is easy to conceive, and might be 
significant. At the limit, she might use it to make a photograph of a laundry that mimics the Arkhipov: 
its surface shiny where it depicts slippery floors, but matt elsewhere; the image unfocussed (and so 
hard to resolve) in just those parts that show wet clothing. Might the result not match the painting in the 
range of interplay it displays? 
 
I doubt any proponent of photography will find this prospect appealing. This way of introducing 
interplay into photography does indeed preserve very clearly the boundary between what imprinting 
contributes and what stems from the artist. But that is because the latter’s intervention occurs only after 
the generation of content. Before she has made any choices about how to distribute reflectance, texture 
and the like across the picture’s surface, the nature of the image to be printed is already determined. 
True, without being printed or projected in some way or other, that image cannot be seen. Imprinting 
fixes content, along with whatever vehicle properties sustain it, but only in potentia. To realise that 
potential, the image must be made visible, and that is what printing or projecting are for. Perhaps it 
follows that strictly speaking there is no image, prior to printing or projecting. Even so, its nature is 
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determined beforehand. Further, it is hard to see how anyone can deploy printing or projecting to 
generate interesting interplay without knowing that nature. 
 
In order to know what the image is like, we need only print or project it in ways that add as few 
detectable properties as possible—the sort of self-effacing embodiment of images that current authentic 
photography involves. To print or project in more flamboyant ways is to give prominence to an activity 
that is distinct from, and, in both temporal and epistemic respects, secondary to, the process of forming 
the image itself. But that last process, imprinting under the photographer’s second order control, is 
already a content-generating activity, with an artistically interesting product as output. Indeed, that 
activity and its product just are the art of authentic photography, as we know it. Flamboyant printing 
amounts to a sort of commentary on, or response to that activity’s output, adjusting local vehicle 
properties so as to reflect, highlight or make observations on, features of the imprinted image. 
 
Such printing might be very interesting from an artistic point of view. It certainly might involve a kind 
of interplay. But it remains far from the phenomenon at the heart of communicative representational 
art. There, content, vehicle properties and the relations between them emerge together in a single, 
integrated process. Here, in contrast, one form of artistically interesting activity, directed imprinting, 
would be supplemented by another, flamboyant printing or projecting, that responds to it. The finished 
photograph would be a composite formed of the products of these two activities: the imprinted image 
and the printing/projection of it. However interesting that composite proved to be, it would resemble 
pairs of art objects where one is commentary on, or response to, the other—the reproductive print and 
the painting that is its source, the illustration and the passage from the novel it illustrates, the ekphrastic 
poem and the picture it attempts to put into words. The image/print composite would be as little like a 
single work of communicative representational art as these pairs are. 
 
Where does this leave the Tomatsu? Does Beer Bottle attain interplay only at the cost of opening up 
this divide between imprinting and commentary? In exploiting its glossiness to communicative effect it, 
like the flamboyant cases just discussed, eschews self-effacement. It does so, however, with relative 
subtlety. In choosing high gloss over low or matt, and making that choice for the photograph as a 
whole, Tomatsu manifests control, but in an understated way. After all, if we make an image visible by 
printing it, the result must have some reflectance property. The photographic practice of his time gave 
Tomatsu few options as to what this might be, and those only in global form. His choice is thus 
comparatively recessive, compared with the Arkhipov-mimicking sort of case. The more a given work 
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draws attention to printing, the greater the pressure forcing the fracture between the imprinted image 
and the printing that makes it visible. Tomatsu’s relatively understated control allows him to tap 
interplay without raising the pressure unduly. 
 
That said, there may be other ways to increase that pressure. In particular, it may be that if many works 
used global vehicle properties to interplay with content, then too the difference between the image and 
its printing would loom larger in our experience. It may be that, if our sense of the unity of authentic 
photography is to be preserved, even cases such as the Tomatsu must remain the exception. 
 
Thus as currently practiced authentic photography offers very little interplay, and nor is it obvious that 
it could be developed so as to offer significantly more. In sum: 
 
(4) Authentic photography offers the artist only limited scope for controlling interplay - i.e. with 
respect to global content neutral properties alone. 
 
So what? Sure, painting offers the artist forms of control that authentic photography does not. Painting 
can thus exploit interplay to a degree that authentic photography struggles even to approximate. But 
surely authentic photography offers its practioners resources that painting does not—if in no other 
respect, in involving imprinting.10 Why, then, think painting is better placed overall, as communicative 
representational art? Why not simply accept that each has its resources, each its limitations? The 
answer is that interplay is not just another resource; its exploitation is central to the very idea of 
communicative representational art: 
 
(5) The exploitation of interplay is central to the full development of communicative 
representational art. 
 
In general, communication is of artistic interest when our interest is engaged not merely by the thought 
being communicated, but by the way in which it is. The means by which communication is effected 
themselves become part of what we attend to. This in turn expands the resources available for 
communication. Since our attention is now partly directed to that which was previously ignored or 
                                                
10 See the last set of examples mentioned in note 7. 
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taken in only peripherally, we may come to pick up on subtle manipulations of these materials, in ways 
we formerly did not. 
 
These last comments apply to all artistically interesting communication, whatever the means by which 
it is achieved. Now let’s apply the point to representational art in particular. Here the primary means 
for communication is, obviously, representation itself. As we have seen, three of the resources of 
representation are content, vehicle properties, and interplay between them. Now, as just noted, these 
resources cannot be exploited to communicate thought unless audiences attend to how they are 
manipulated. This imposes a natural ordering on them. Unless content is attended to, we don’t have 
anything recognizable as representational art at all. (How can art be representational unless its 
representing plays some role in its interest?) Thus the basic form of representational art will 
communicate thought through content. However, once content is attended to, further steps are possible. 
In the first instance, attention might expand to include vehicle properties of the representation. But only 
once both content and vehicle properties are objects of attention can the relation between them become 
so. Thus there is a specific path along which communicative representational art can evolve: from the 
elementary form where content does the work, to the more developed form where vehicle properties 
also do so, to the most developed where interplay is exploited.11 
 
Nothing said here depends on accidents of any particular form of representational art. All I have done is 
to unpack the basic idea of such a thing. But then exploiting interplay to communicate thought is the 
culmination of the very idea of representational art—it is the end of the road along which such art can 
travel. Since painting is in a strong position to exploit such interplay, and authentic photography is not, 
it seems the latter falls short, compared to at least one other representational art. (Nor is painting likely 
to be unique in this respect.) Hence we reach our conclusion: 
 
(I) If interplay is to play a role in the communication of thought, and thus in communicative 
representational art, it must lie under the artist’s control, in a way that appreciators can detect. 
 
                                                
11 What about the other resources of representation, means of making (which was in my original list in §2), or relations 
between the content of different representations, and relations between their vehicle properties (which came up at the start 
of §3)? These do not significantly alter matters. Interplay is the only resource attention to which presupposes attention to 
both content and vehicle properties. (Means of making and relations between contents require attention only to content, 
relations between vehicle properties require attending only to vehicle properties.) Thus it alone constitutes the terminus on 
the road communicative representational art might travel. The road might have its by-ways, but there is only one end-point. 
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(2) To have suitable control of interplay, the artist must control vehicle properties 
independently of content. The candidates for such control are content-determining, local 
content-neutral and global content-neutral properties. 
 
(3) ‘Painting’ offers the artist this control, in respect of all three candidate properties. 
 
(4) Authentic photography offers the artist only limited scope for controlling interplay - i.e. with 
respect to global content neutral properties alone. 
 
(5) The exploitation of interplay is central to the full development of communicative 
representational art. 
 
So 
(C) Authentic photography, unlike painting, is not able to develop to the full as a communicative 
representational art. 
 
Photography’s self-conception as imprinting is therefore in tension with a natural ambition for it, to 
develop to the full as communicative representational art. This is the real challenge to photography. 
 
 
§4 Taking the Challenge Seriously 
This challenge is no doubt less extreme than that Scruton’s paper sought to pose. The argument does 
not dispute that photography represents, that it can communicate thought, that it can do so in a way that 
exploits more than the photograph’s content, and that in virtue of all this it might be of considerable 
interest as representational art. However, what it lacks in hyperbole, the challenge makes up for in 
seriousness. 
 
Or so one might think. Various responses to the challenge might be offered. Defenders of photography 
might look for some mistake in the argument for (C). Or they might accept that the argument applies to 
authentic photography as actually practised, but take this as an invitation to develop the artform so as to 
transcend its limitations. Or they might simply deny the challenge matters: the argument for (C) goes 
through, but (C) is of no consequence. Since I have already sketched some of the obstacles that any 
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development of photography would have to negotiate, in what remains, I consider the first and last 
kinds of response, beginning with one attempt to identify a gap in the argument. 
 
Does the argument really consider all the opportunities for interplay open to authentic photography? 
Sceptics might complain that it overlooks at least two possibilities. One is interplay between vehicle 
properties and non-depictive content. The argument is confined to depictive content. That is the content 
by reference to which imprinting is defined, and thus control of which imprinting precludes. Nothing in 
the idea of authentic photography denies the photographer (first order) control over content of other 
kinds. Yet depictive content, though ubiquitous and fundamental, is not the only content photography 
can bear. For instance, a photograph might depict one thing and thereby symbolise another (as in the 
example of the dove and peace), or it might depict a particular that exemplifies a type (as in Dorothea 
Lange’s famous images of suffering in the Great Depression). Perhaps the photographer can 
communicate thought by exploiting interplay between vehicle properties and contents of these other 
kinds. 
 
The other possibility is to exploit relations within depictive content. The authentic photographer may 
have very limited control over vehicle properties independently of depicted content, but she has plenty 
of (second order) control over the details of that content, even taking its broad subject matter as fixed. 
She has, for instance, a range of possible compositions within which to present her subject, and her 
choice among them might be highly revealing of how she thinks of it.12 Of course, such intra-content 
relations will not count as interplay: that is specifically restricted to relations between content and 
vehicle properties. But they are at least its cousins. Why should their exploitation not be just as central 
to communicative representational art? 
 
The sceptics are right to think that these resources are available to authentic photography, and no doubt 
they can be exploited to communicate thought. However, it is interplay in the form discussed above 
that lies at the heart of fully developed representational art. Of course, much representational art is not 
pictorial, and so does not involve depictive content at all. But for every representational art there is a 
form of content—sometimes several—basic to it. For the pictorial arts, this content is depictive; for the 
purely literary arts, it is linguistic; for theatre it is that form of content constituted by the imitation of 
                                                
12 Though the issue is delicate, this is how I would treat the role of geometrical structure—something which, as David 
Davies (2008) argues, serves in the work of Cartier Bresson as a device for communicating thought. 
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speech, action and setting; and so on. In every art, the basic form(s) of content can be complemented by 
content of less basic kinds: a description or musical representation of a dove might symbolise peace as 
easily as a depiction of one. The journey common to all the arts is, however, first and foremost through 
the possibilities opened up by basic content. Whatever form that basic content takes, the central 
developmental arc of a communicative representational art lies in tapping, first content of that basic 
kind, then properties of the vehicle for those contents, then interplay between the former and the latter. 
The exploration of interesting relations within basic content is a phase in the first stage of this 
development. And the exploration of relations between non-basic content and vehicle properties lies 
outside that arc altogether. Such explorations might be of great interest. Art that undertakes them might 
be more sophisticated than art that does not. Nevertheless, they are incidental to the main plot. 
 
I turn now to scepticism about the significance of (C). It has several possible sources. (C) is addressed 
to authentic photography, but how much photography is authentic? The first way to shun the challenge 
answers ‘not much’. In the digital age, photographers can readily manipulate their images in a wide 
variety of ways. Even in the analogue era serious photographers often went in for various darkroom 
techniques that at least threaten authenticity— adding washes to the negative, or burning or dodging in 
printing from it. Perhaps, then, very little photography that seeks to be of artistic interest also aims to 
be authentic. If not, why care if authentic photography is limited in the way (C) claims? 
 
I think it a serious question just how much art photography is authentic. I suspect the first sceptical 
response underestimates the portion that is. However, since it would be difficult to argue this without 
reviewing a wide range of examples, I offer a different reply. (C) may explicitly target authentic 
photography, but the claim promises to generalise significantly. 
 
A good deal of non-authentic photography is made to look authentic. Many images that have been 
digitally manipulated, for instance, are hard to tell from those that have not. This is true of 
manipulation in the name of art as much as manipulation for more mundane purposes. (Consider, for 
example, some of Jeff Wall’s best known work.) But if non-authentic photography is to look authentic, 
it loses many of the benefits of abandoning authenticity. What the photographer needs, remember, is 
not merely to control interplay, but to use that control to make her communicative intentions manifest. 
Abandoning authenticity offers her the requisite control. But if her manipulation is apparent, the result 
will not look like authentic photography. And if it is not apparent, then, while she exercises control, she 
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does not manifest it: her audience will not pick up on her intentions.13 If non-authentic photography is 
to look authentic, it cannot use the greater control it offers over interplay to communicate thought. 
 
The second way to shun the challenge rejects the idea that authentic photography should aim to develop 
as communicative representational art. Since such art involves a distinctive means (representation) to a 
distinctive end (communication), we can reject the aim by rejecting either of those. Suppose we reject 
the end. Perhaps ‘communicative’ art’s point is not to communicate, but to demonstrate the difficulty 
or impossibility of genuine communication.14 I suspect my challenge can be reformulated to 
accommodate this. Whether the goal is to use representation to communicate thought or to demonstrate 
the difficulties of doing so, the resources for pursuing it are the same, and the same disparity will obtain 
between those available to authentic photography and those available to other arts, such as painting. 
 
What, then, if we reject the means? The argument for the centrality of interplay to communicative 
representational art (§3b) apparently relies on the idea that the goal of any form of art should be to 
make best use of the resources peculiar to it. Here the art is representational, so the resources are those 
of representation. This sounds like the sort of concern with medium, and with exploring the 
possibilities it opens up, that was characteristic of Modernism. But why think artists are still interested 
in that? These days, artists, including those who work with photography, use whatever they can to 
achieve their aims (Campany 2003:18-20, Batchen 1997: ch.1). Photographers not only manipulate 
images (thereby abandoning authentic photography), they also tap a variety of methods that are not 
even photographic (thereby refusing to limit themselves to photography in any form). Purity of 
medium, and the single-minded exploitation of the resources it offers, is no longer their interest. The 
challenge relies on a conception of communicative representational art that is simply outmoded. 
 
However, I have been working at a different level of generality from the Modernist. She requires that 
each art—painting, theatre, sculpture, literature, etc.— does what it alone can do, or at least do 
uniquely well. My notion of representational art is broad enough to encompass all these. Any ‘medium’ 
it makes central is simply representation itself, more specifically the resources that offers. And the 
ambition I propose, to exploit that ‘medium’ to the full, is proposed equally for them all. We have seen 
                                                
13 Of course, background knowledge of the artist’s intentions might enable us to divine what the work alone does not 
disclose. However, as noted (n.9), if all works of a certain kind depend for their effect on independently acquired knowledge 
of the effect intended, works of that kind seem, in this respect, communicatively inert. 
14 See Schwarte 2008, which traces the idea in the work of Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Adorno. 
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that painting is in a position to fulfil this ambition, as authentic photography is not. Of course, in 
making that case I have at times done so in terms specific to the pictorial arts: e.g. interplay between 
depictive content and vehicle properties. Moreover, I grant that different arts will involve different 
forms of basic content. But for every representational art the same question arises: can it exploit the full 
range of resources made available by its basic form(s) of representation (content of the relevant kind(s), 
vehicle properties, interplay and means of making) in the communication of thought? And the answer, 
in most cases, will surely be ‘yes’. Why doubt that, say, sculpture, theatre, and literature will be as well 
placed as painting to do this? If photography is not in that fortunate position, that is a striking fact—and 
one does not have to be some form of Modernist to find it so.15 
 
Robert Hopkins 
New York University 
robert.hopkins@nyu.edu  
                                                
15 I owe an unusually heavy debt to the members of the numerous audiences who heard precursors of this paper, some of 
whom will no longer recognize it, given the sweeping changes their observations inspired. I’m particularly grateful to 
Paloma Atencia Linares, Jiri Benofsky, Diarmuid Costello, and Martin Steenhagen, who provided written comments; and to 
Alfred Archer, Al Baker, Cat Saint Croix, David Davies, Daan Evers, Dominic Gregory, Margaret Iverson, Dominic Lopes, 
Aaron Meskin, Ludger Schwarte, Michael Stynes, Kendall Walton, Alan Wilson and Dawn Wilson. 
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